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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
The Fair Punishment Project is a joint 
initiative of Harvard Law School’s Charles Hamilton 
Houston Institute for Race & Justice and its 
Criminal Justice Institute. In seeking to ensure that 
the U.S. justice system is fair and accountable, we 
highlight the gross injustices resulting from 
prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective defense 
lawyering, and racial bias, and challenge the 
unconstitutional use of excessive punishment. 
The Jacobs Burns Center for Ethics in the 
Practice of Law at Cardozo School of Law sponsors 
courses, programs, and events that provoke dialogue 
and critical thought on ethical and moral issues of 
professional responsibility. The Center helps prepare 
students to face, with integrity, the difficult and 
important questions that arise in all areas of legal 
practice. In the past five years, the Center’s work 
has focused upon ethical issues in the criminal 
justice system, and includes conferences, programs, 
and publications related to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and ethical obligations of 
criminal defense lawyers.  
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics 
works in collaboration with law students, 
practitioners, judges and legal scholars to study and 
improve the legal profession by: honoring exemplary 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the Rules of this Court, the 
parties were timely notified of amici’s intent to file this brief. 
Petitioner and Respondent have consented to the filing of this 
brief. The letters granting consent are filed herewith. Pursuant 
to Rule 37.6, this brief was not written in whole or in part by 
counsel for any party, and no person or entity other than 
amicus and its counsel has made a monetary contribution to 
the preparation and submission of this brief. 
2 
lawyers; inculcating ethics into teaching law; 
training future lawyers “in the service of others”; 
incorporating ethical and professional values into 
academic and mentoring programs; and encouraging 
scholarly inquiry and scholarship on the professional 
conduct and regulation of lawyers. Above all, the 
Stein Center fosters an understanding of “ethical 
legal practice” that goes beyond adherence to the 
rules set forth in professional codes of conduct. 
The Ethics Bureau at Yale drafts amicus 
briefs in cases concerning professional responsibility; 
assists defense counsel with ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims relating to professional responsibility; 
and offers ethics advice and counsel on a pro bono 
basis to not-for-profit legal service providers, courts, 
and law schools.2 
Our organizations respectfully submit this 
brief because we have an abiding interest in 
ensuring that courts recognize and enforce 
prosecutors’ constitutional obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. We believe that when courts 
do not enforce Brady, they not only damage the 
integrity of the proceedings at issue, but also 
undermine public confidence in the legal system. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Efforts to hold Louisiana prosecutors to 
account for withholding exculpatory evidence have 
failed. Every mechanism for accountability—judicial 
review, attorney discipline, civil liability—is 
currently unfit for the task. Indeed, in the Angola 
                                                 
2 The references to amici’s affiliations are for 
identification purposes only. This brief does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the above-mentioned universities or law 
schools. 
3 
Five prosecutions of Mr. Brown and his co-
defendants who were charged with killing a prison 
guard during an escape attempt, attorneys for one of 
Mr. Brown’s co-defendants filed a disciplinary 
complaint against the prosecutors who took the 
suppressed statement that Mr. Brown’s attorneys 
discovered only after his capital trial. The Louisiana 
Attorney Disciplinary Board’s Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel dismissed the complaint “[b]ecause the 
same Court that would consider the potential ethics 
violation has already determined that the statement 
was not ‘favorable’ . . . .” Letter from Charles B. 
Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, La. Attorney 
Disciplinary Bd., to Lawrence T. Dupre (Feb. 29, 
2016) (hereinafter “ODC Letter”) (attached at 
Appendix A) at p. 3-4. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Brown thus not only deprived him 
of the new penalty phase he deserves, but also 
precludes the professional accountability Louisiana 
so clearly needs.    
This case presents an important opportunity 
to ensure both that defendants’ due process rights 
receive the protections they deserve and that 
prosecutors behave in accordance with their 
professional duties. Judicial enforcement of Brady is 
a necessary component of a functional criminal 
justice system, especially in the state with the 
country’s highest incarceration rate. Too often, the 
Louisiana courts misapprehend the constitutional 
doctrine, stripping defendants of protections, 
incentivizing prosecutorial noncompliance, and 
depriving juries and judges of information essential 
to the fair determination of both guilt and 
punishment. Along with the disciplinary process’s 
failure and civil liability’s limited reach, the state 
judiciary’s approach amplifies the risk of unfair 
4 
outcomes, providing a compelling reason for granting 
certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LOUISIANA COURTS CONSISTENTLY 
MISINTERPRET AND MISAPPLY BRADY—
REQUIRING THE FEDERAL COURTS TO 
PROVIDE SUPERVISION AND RELIEF 
The Louisiana judiciary’s failure to treat 
Brady claims appropriately warrants attention. The 
“duty to administer justice occasionally requires 
busy judges to engage in a detailed review of the 
particular facts of a case . . . .” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 455 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). That 
duty, which arises here for this Court, is particularly 
pressing when the state courts’ rulings substantially 
delay constitutionally warranted relief. See Wearry 
v. Cain, No. 14-10008 (Mar. 7, 2016), slip op. at 11 
(“The alternative to granting review, after all, is 
forcing [the petitioner] to endure yet more time on 
Louisiana’s death row in service of a conviction that 
is constitutionally flawed.”).         
The courts in Louisiana have consistently 
misinterpreted and misapplied Brady and its 
progeny. Indeed, this Court has explicated the 
doctrine in a number of serious cases arising from 
Louisiana. Those cases—and the state courts’ failure 
to meaningfully engage them after-the-fact—
underscore the urgency of Mr. Brown’s petition. Not 
only do the dispositions in Wearry v. Cain, No. 14-
10008 (Mar. 7, 2016), Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 
(2012), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), 
demonstrate that a problem of apperception endures, 
but the way in which the state courts ruled also 
reveals a deeper pattern of judicial obliviousness.  
5 
The story of Michael Wearry’s case 
underscores the problem with Louisiana state court 
review. After his conviction was affirmed on direct 
review, “it emerged that the prosecution had 
withheld relevant information” that would have 
unsettled the State’s case. Wearry, slip op. at 3. The 
post-conviction trial court noted that “the State 
‘probably ought to have’ disclosed the withheld 
evidence” but nevertheless denied relief. Id., slip op. 
at 6. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Wearry’s 
writ for review over the votes of one justice who 
would have granted relief on a separate ground and 
another justice who would have remanded for other 
reasons. See State ex rel. Wearry v. Cain, 161 So. 3d 
620 (La. 2015). Yet, this Court issued a per curiam 
decision over the dissent of two justices finding that 
“[b]eyond doubt, the newly revealed evidence suffices 
to undermine confidence in Wearry’s conviction . . . .” 
Wearry, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). But no 
Louisiana court had expressed a doubt about the 
Brady claims.3 
In Smith, this Court issued a powerful 
statement. In an 8-1 decision, it found that the 
impeachment evidence the State withheld was 
material because the relevant witness’s “testimony 
was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime.” 
132 U.S. at 630 (emphasis in original). Despite the 
conspicuous problems with the petitioner’s murder 
convictions, no Louisiana judge reached the result 
                                                 
3 Although this Court’s decision in the petitioner’s favor 
in Kyles was accompanied by a four-justice dissent, it is 
remarkable that no Louisiana judge found that the State’s 
suppression warranted a new trial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422. 
Especially considering that “[b]ecause the State withheld 
evidence, its case was much stronger, and the defense case 
much weaker.” Id. at 429. 
6 
this Court did.4 Yet, this Court made clear that 
Brady must mean something and overturned the five 
murder convictions at issue.5 That decision 
eventually led to the reversal of Smith’s death 
sentence in another murder case because the 
overturned convictions were at the heart of the 
State’s case for capital punishment.6  
 This Court is not the only federal court that 
has provided protracted corrective guidance to 
Louisiana’s courts. Even constrained by the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) and considerations of comity, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the federal district 
courts in Louisiana have overturned state court 
Brady decisions on many occasions.  
In DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 
2002), the state appealed the Eastern District’s 
grant of Brady relief to Douglas DiLosa on his 
                                                 
4 See id.; State v. Smith, 45 So.3d 1065 (La. 2010). 
Eleven members of Louisiana’s judiciary—the trial court judge, 
a panel of three appellate court judges, and all seven Louisiana 
Supreme Court justices— ruled against Mr. Smith in what can 
be described as a rout of his Brady claims. 
5 While it appears that several justices were 
incredulous with the State’s position at oral argument—one 
justice even asked whether the State considered confessing 
error—this incredulity and the majority opinion contrasts with 
the fact that the State’s position had been a slam-dunk in the 
state courts. See Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuke a New Orleans 
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011; Lyle Denniston, 
Argument Recap: Disaster at the Lectern, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 
8, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/argument-recap-
disaster-at-the-lectern/.   
6 See John Simerman, New Orleans judge voids death 
sentence for inmate convicted of 1995 triple murder, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, June 12, 2012, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf 
/2012/06/new_orleans_judge_voids_death.html. 
7 
murder conviction. At trial, the State persuaded 
jurors that Mr. DiLosa killed his wife to collect life 
insurance proceeds. In his defense, DiLosa claimed 
that two African-American intruders had come into 
the house and knocked him unconscious before 
killing his wife. In post-conviction, DiLosa uncovered 
“four main categories of withheld evidence,” 
including exculpatory non-Caucasian hair found on 
the rope used to strangle the victim, exculpatory 
fingerprint evidence, and statements from neighbors 
suggesting other criminal activity in the 
neighborhood on the night of the murder. Id. at 263. 
In affirming the federal district court’s ruling, the 
Fifth Circuit—governed by AEDPA—explained:  
The state court exceeded the bounds of 
permissible application of federal law in 
two distinct ways. First, it applied an 
incorrect legal principle in concluding 
there was no material evidence for 
Brady purposes. Second, its ultimate 
legal conclusion cannot be squared with 
the command of Brady and its progeny. 
The state court’s legal conclusion was 
objectively unreasonable.7 
279 F.3d at 263-64. Moreover, the state court 
“applied a rule of law contrary to” established 
Supreme Court precedent because it evaluated the 
exculpatory evidence by looking at whether it was 
sufficient to exculpate DiLosa rather than “through 
                                                 
7 The post-conviction trial court denied DiLosa’s Brady 
claim on November 13, 1996. A panel of the Louisiana Fifth 
Circuit denied a subsequent supervisory writ application. State 
v. DiLosa, 97-191 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/97). The Louisiana 
Supreme Court then unanimously denied a subsequent 
supervisory writ application. State v. DiLosa, 709 So.2d 694 
(La. 1998). 
8 
the lens of [the court’s] confidence in the verdict.” Id. 
at 264. These unreasonable applications of law 
required a new trial where “[t]he state [] based its 
case on the non-existence of evidence it knew 
existed.” Id. at 265. Mr. DiLosa was eventually 
exonerated of the crime for which he once faced life 
imprisonment.8 
 The Fifth Circuit revisited the Louisiana 
judiciary’s treatment of Brady in Tassin v. Cain, 517 
F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2008). In that capital case, the 
state courts twice refused to grant relief under 
Brady. On the first petition for post-conviction relief, 
the trial court “reject[ed] Tassin’s claim that the 
State’s suppression of the agreement between 
[testifying co-defendant] Georgina and the trial court 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” 517 F.3d at 
775. Around the time he filed his federal habeas 
petition, Tassin discovered new evidence and filed a 
second post-conviction petition in state court. The 
state courts denied relief on the supplemented and 
amended Brady claims.9 Id. The Fifth Circuit 
explained that “the state habeas court had 
erroneously required Robert to show that the court 
had ‘promised’ Georgina a lenient sentence . . . .” Id. 
at 776. The federal district court correctly held that 
the state court’s ruling was “contrary to federal law 
because it applied a more stringent standard than 
the one established by Supreme Court precedent.” 
                                                 
8 See Page for Douglas Dilosa’s Case, THE NATIONAL 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3178 (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
9 Following the post-conviction court’s denial of Tassin’s 
Brady claim, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his 
supervisory writ application unanimously without opinion. 
State ex rel. Tassin v. Cain, 883 So.2d 995 (La. 2004). 
9 
Id. Tassin did not need to show “a firm ‘promise’” 
with the co-defendant existed in order to challenge 
her credibility. Id. at 777. On these grounds, the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of a new trial given 
the “violation of a clear precedent.” Id. at 781.  
Like many other Louisiana Brady cases, 
“David Mahler’s state post-conviction proceedings 
ended when the Louisiana Supreme Court, without 
setting forth supporting reasons, denied his writ 
application.”10 Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 498 
(5th Cir. 2008). The State had withheld evidence 
suggesting that the struggle between the victim and 
defendant before the homicide was ongoing in nature 
rather than complete when Mahler inflicted the fatal 
wound. See id. at 503. The post-conviction trial 
court’s denial of the Brady claim employed a far-too-
narrow view of the suppressed evidence. The Fifth 
Circuit explained: 
Contrary to the state trial court’s 
conclusion, the withheld pretrial 
statements do not merely reinforce the 
fact established at trial that a 
“struggle” had occurred at some point 
before Mahler shot Zimmer. Rather, 
when considered collectively, they 
suggest that Zimmer’s struggle with 
Christopher Mahler for the shotgun 
was an ongoing event—the outcome of 
which remained uncertain—when the 
shooting occurred. This stands in stark 
                                                 
10 Following the trial court’s denial of post-conviction 
relief on Mahler’s Brady claim, supervisory writ applications 
were denied by a panel of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, State v. 
Mahler, No. 2004-K-1018 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2004), and by a 
unanimous Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Mahler, 893 
So.2d 85 (La. 2005). 
10 
contrast to the picture painted by the 
prosecution witnesses’ trial testimony 
that the struggle had conclusively 
ended and Zimmer had already turned 
away to run or head toward his truck 
before Mahler shot him. 
Id. In other words, facts about the shooting’s 
circumstances could have made a difference to the 
jury’s determination of whether the crime 
constituted a murder, manslaughter, or even self-
defense. Noting “the deferential standard of review 
required by the AEDPA,” the Fifth Circuit held that 
“the state trial court unreasonably applied clearly 
established federal law . . . in determining that the 
witness statements at issue were not material.” Id. 
at 500.  
Louisiana state court errors also led to Fifth 
Circuit action in LaCaze v. Warden Louisiana Corr. 
Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2011). 
Looking back on Princess LaCaze’s second-degree 
murder conviction, the court assessed impeachment 
evidence similar to the kind withheld in Tassin—
evidence of a witness’s agreement with the 
prosecution that would have helped the defense call 
into question the veracity of that co-defendant’s 
testimony. While the State in LaCaze provided 
notice before trial that it would reduce the charges 
against co-defendant Robinson in exchange for his 
testimony at LaCaze’s trial, “[t]he State never 
disclosed, however, that it had assured Robinson 
that his son would not be prosecuted if he agreed to 
make a statement implicating LaCaze.” LaCaze, 645 
F.3d at 731. After holding an evidentiary hearing, 
the post-conviction trial court denied relief, stating 
that Robinson did not testify because of the 
prosecutor’s assurances regarding potential 
11 
prosecution of his son and there was “overwhelming” 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 733. The 
Louisiana Third Circuit found that “the trial court 
erred in denying her application for post-conviction 
relief,” but “the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed 
in a two-paragraph, per curiam opinion, with two 
judges noting that they ‘would grant [the writ] and 
docket.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). The federal 
Fifth Circuit overruled the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s materiality determination, finding—like this 
Court did in Smith—that prosecutorial suppression 
of exculpatory evidence implicating the 
trustworthiness of “the only direct evidence 
presented by the State to show a critical element” of 
the crime warranted a new trial. Id. at 738. 
Given that the Fifth Circuit granted new 
trials in DiLosa, Tassin, Mahler, and LaCaze under 
AEDPA, it is not surprising that the court also 
reversed Louisiana denials of Brady relief in a 
number of pre-AEDPA cases. See, e.g., Lindsey v. 
King, 769 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting a new 
trial to a man sentenced to death); Monroe v. 
Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (granting a 
new trial in an armed robbery case); cf. Blanton v. 
Blackburn, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming 
Brady relief in murder case granted by federal 
district court in the Middle District of Louisiana, see 
Blanton v. Blackburn, 494 F.Supp. 895 (M.D.La. 
1980)).  
So marred is the state courts’ track record 
that federal district court judges have had to expend 
resources to explain that their determinations of 
federal law actually bind the state judiciary. For 
example, in Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958 (5th 
Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a federal 
district court ruling that required the state courts to 
12 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on Ronald Monroe’s 
Brady claim. When the case returned to federal court 
after remand, the district court pointed out that it 
had previously decided that “Monroe’s due process 
Brady rights were violated.” Monroe v. Butler, 690 F. 
Supp. 521, 523 (E.D. La. 1988), aff’d, 853 F.2d 924 
(5th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted). Yet, 
“when the state court addressed this same issue” on 
remand it held that the petitioner had no Brady 
interest at stake. See id. “Thus, the state court 
mistakenly rejected [the district court’s] Brady 
holding. That the state court erred in this respect is 
clear.” Id. Though this case is not recent, the 
troubles it exemplifies persist today. 
The state courts’ treatment of Brady in 
Johnson v. Cain, 68 F. Supp. 3d 593 (E.D. La. 2014), 
underscores this reality. As it did in Mahler, the 
prosecution in Johnson failed to disclose to the 
defense evidence suggesting that the petitioner’s 
conduct occurred in a wholly different context than 
the one the State presented to the jury at trial. The 
State’s key witness initially told police investigators 
“a very different version of events on the day of the 
incident.” Johnson, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 612. Rather 
than the trial version—in which Johnson 
purportedly kicked and shot the surviving witness 
after he was already on the ground—the police 
report detailed a quick exchange in which Mr. 
Johnson jumped out of a car and fired at the witness 
one time immediately after he saw the witness 
punch his brother in the mouth. See id. Instead of 
deciding on the merits, the state court denied the 
claim on procedural grounds. See id. at 610. Yet, 
that procedural bar did not impress the federal 
court, which found that the state court imposed it on 
the basis of an error in “[s]imple math.” Id. at 610 
13 
n.11. Reviewing the Brady claim on the merits, the 
federal court granted Mr. Johnson relief. Id. at 613. 
Federal district courts have provided relief on 
Brady claims in several other cases. See Blanton v. 
Blackburn, 494 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 
654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981); Faulkner v. Cain, 133 
F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. La. 2001); Robinson v. Cain, 
510 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. La. 2007); Perez v. Cain, 
2008 WL 108661 (E.D. La. 2008), aff’d, 529 F.3d 588 
(5th Cir. 2008); Triplett v. Cain, No. 04-1434 (E.D. 
La. 2011). In other instances, federal district court 
rulings have paved the way for ultimately favorable 
Brady determinations. See Hudson v. Whitley, 979 
F.2d 1058, 1060-65 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing an 
adverse procedural ruling and remanding for merits 
determination of Brady claim);11 cf. Kirkpatrick v. 
Whitley, 992 F.2d 491, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(granting an evidentiary hearing on claim that the 
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence).  
While federal courts have provided a measure 
of corrective oversight, AEDPA significantly limits 
the circumstances under which a federal court can 
reverse a state conviction. See Peters v. Cain, 34 F. 
App’x 151, *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“even if 
this court would have concluded that such a 
probability existed were we looking at the case in the 
first instance, we cannot reverse the state court’s 
determination that no violation occurred unless it 
involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law”). This means that looking 
                                                 
11 “Based on the . . . prosecutorial misconduct . . . a 
Federal District Court vacated Hudson’s conviction and 
remanded the case for retrial in February, 1993.” Page for 
Larry Hudson’s Case, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration 
/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3313 (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).  
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only to the universe of cases in which federal courts 
ultimately granted habeas relief understates the 
persistent problems with state court review. After 
all, AEDPA is simply “a ‘guard against extreme 
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ 
not a substitute for ordinary error correction.” 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) 
(internal citation omitted). Add to AEDPA the fact 
that Brady materiality determinations are often 
difficult, fact-intensive judgment calls,12 and it 
becomes apparent that federal courts only overturn 
state court Brady denials in exceptional 
circumstances. 
This brief does not entail an exhaustive 
review of all relevant federal habeas rulings. 
Instead, it gathers an exemplary set to establish the 
proposition that Louisiana’s state courts often 
misapply Brady’s critical constitutional commands.13 
II. OTHER MECHANISMS FOR CURTAILING 
THE SUPPRESSION OF EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE HAVE FAILED IN LOUISIANA  
Courts have long suggested that prosecutors 
will comply with their constitutional obligations 
because mechanisms other than judicial review of 
                                                 
12 See Banks v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 295, 322 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
13 Notably, in defending his office’s conduct in Kyles, 
long-serving Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick 
wrote the following in a letter to the editor of the New Orleans 
Times Picayune: “In the Kyles case, for example, five separate 
state and federal courts on seven different occasions concluded 
that my prosecutors had not violated the duty to disclose before 
the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision reversed Kyles’ 
conviction.” Harry Connick, DA’s Office Does Not Suppress 
Evidence, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 19, 1999. 
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Brady claims will hold them to account. See, e.g., 
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 66 (2011) (“An 
attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is 
subject to professional discipline, including 
sanctions, suspension, and disbarment.”). 
Unfortunately, minimizing the role of criminal 
courts in ensuring prosecutorial accountability has 
created a vacuum in which external oversight ceases 
to exist. It turns out, perversely, that the Louisiana 
judiciary’s Brady rulings undercut the disciplinary 
process. In the Angola Five prosecutions, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown actually 
led to the dismissal of the disciplinary complaint 
filed against the prosecutors who took the 
exculpatory statement. Where a disciplinary body 
finds itself bound by adverse judicial rulings and 
district attorney offices can only face civil liability in 
instances which are virtually impossible to conjure 
let alone prove,14 decisions like Brown relinquish 
constitutional rights to the prosecutor’s discretion.     
A. Professional Sanctions Against 
Louisiana Prosecutors are a Paper 
Tiger 
Even after this Court’s decisions in Kyles and 
Smith, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not 
discipline any of the prosecutors responsible for 
those Brady violations. The prosecutorial 
                                                 
14 See David Keenan, et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial 
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing 
Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 216 
(2011) (“Connick’s holding that a failure-to-train showing can 
only be made by demonstrating a pattern of violations—
information that might be difficult for individual plaintiffs to 
access—will make such suits exceedingly difficult to win.”). 
16 
wrongdoing that led to the high-profile wrongful 
conviction of John Thompson also resulted in no 
professional sanctions against practicing 
prosecutors.15 In a state with a long and well-known 
history of electing aggressive District Attorneys 
dismissive of their ethical duties,16 the body 
responsible for investigating ethical complaints and 
making disciplinary recommendations to the state 
supreme court has only once secured professional 
discipline for prosecutorial misconduct.17 In 
Louisiana, the prospect of professional discipline for 
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence is a paper 
tiger. 
It appears that even the process for 
registering a complaint with the disciplinary board 
becomes an insurmountable obstacle when the 
complaint targets a prosecutor. The process operates 
differently not on paper but in practice. After an 
                                                 
15 The lone recipient of professional discipline for the 
wrongful criminal convictions of John Thompson was a former 
prosecutor who had become a defense attorney by the time he 
learned of the exculpatory evidence. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court reprimanded him for failing to disclose that the dying 
prosecutor confessed to suppressing evidence. See In re 
Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239 (La. 2005); Connick, 563 U.S. at 56 
n.1.  
16 See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans 
Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. 
Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 925 (2012) (“Thus, it 
is hardly surprising that [under Harry Connick] ‘[t]he 
prosecutors’ record of compliance with Brady remained dismal 
even after Kyles, as evidenced by several Brady violations that 
prosecutors committed in trials after April 1995—including in 
two capital cases.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
17 See In re Jordan, 913 So.2d 775, 784 (La. 2005) 
(handing down a three-month fully-deferred suspension against 
prosecutor Roger Jordan for knowingly violating Brady 
obligations).  
17 
Orleans Parish trial court granted a defendant’s 
motion for new trial because of Brady violations in a 
murder case that resulted in a death sentence, one 
highly respected member of the bar filed complaints 
against every implicated prosecutor.18 It took two 
years for the board to even acknowledge receipt of 
these complaints.19 To this day—almost five years 
later—the board has made no recommendations. 
Nothing about the state’s ethical standards 
explains the lack of professional accountability. In 
fact, Louisiana’s ethical rules are more rigorous than 
those in most other jurisdictions. Unlike many 
states, the Louisiana regime does not contain a 
willfulness requirement, meaning prosecutors who 
unintentionally violate ethical rules can be held 
responsible. See, e.g., LA. ST. BAR ART. 16 RPC Rule 
3.8(d); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar 
Association in Support of Petitioner Juan Smith 
(“ABA Amicus”), 2011 WL 3739380, at *9.20 With 
respect to the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, 
Louisiana’s ethical rules do not maintain a 
                                                 
18 See Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s 
Misbehaving Prosecutors, And The System That Protects 
Them, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconduct-new-orleans-
louisiana_n_3529891.html. 
19 See Radley Balko, In Louisiana prosecutor offices, a 
toxic culture of death and invincibility, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 
6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp 
/2015/04/06/in-louisiana-prosecutor-offices-a-toxic-culture-of-
death-and-invincibility/. 
20 “To the extent Louisiana has modified Rule 3.8(d), it 
has done so . . . only to impose more rigorous disclosure 
obligations on prosecutors. The Louisiana rule thus requires 
not only disclosure of evidence that the prosecutor ‘knows’ to be 
exculpatory but also disclosure of evidence that the prosecutor 
‘reasonably should know’ is exculpatory.” 
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materiality requirement. See ABA Amicus, supra, at 
*10; ODC Letter at p. 2 (noting the “sharp debate 
across the country” about whether prosecutors 
should consider materiality pretrial to comply Rule 
3.8(d)); id. (stating “our position that 3.8(d) does not 
incorporate” materiality considerations). Thus, the 
failure to turn over any evidence favorable to a 
criminal defendant represents an ethical breach. 
Although the rules thus appear reasonably 
protective of the public interest in regulating 
prosecutors, we nevertheless see no accountability.    
While courts apparently rely on the 
disciplinary board to keep prosecutors accountable, 
the board appears to rely on judicial rulings to 
determine whether some ethical complaints have 
merit. In the Angola Five prosecutions, the ODC 
noted that “there does not appear to be any 
jurisprudence or scholarly analysis suggesting that 
there is a variance between what is considered to be 
‘favorable’ or ‘mitigating’ under the Brady case-law 
versus Rule 3.8(d).” ODC Letter at p. 3. Evidently 
stuck with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s finding 
that the suppressed statement was not even 
“favorable” to co-defendants Brown, Carley, and 
Mathis, the ODC closed the investigation and 
dismissed the complaint while “reserving the right 
. . . to reopen this matter should a different ruling 
relevant to the analysis be handed down.” ODC 
Letter at p. 4. The complaint’s dismissal corresponds 
to the nationwide under-enforcement of professional 
rules requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.21   
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It 
Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U. D.C. L. 
REV. 275, 288 (2004) (finding that prosecutors who 
intentionally suppress evidence “are rarely, if ever, 
19 
B. Civil Liability is Reserved for Only 
Extraordinarily Extreme Cases  
This Court’s majority opinion in Connick 
severely limits the possibility that civil liability will 
serve to hold prosecutors accountable or deter 
prospective misconduct. There, the Court held that a 
single Brady constitutional violation was insufficient 
to make the jurisdiction liable for failing to train its 
prosecutors to comply with Brady. See Connick, 563 
U.S. at 63-64. The majority opinion rejected liability 
on Thompson’s failure-to-train theory by relying 
upon the fact that prosecutors’ professional 
judgments are informed by their law school 
education, the bar exam, continuing education 
courses, character and fitness requirements, training 
received while on the job, and the possibility of 
professional discipline. See id. In dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out that “[t]he prosecutorial 
concealment Thompson encountered, however, is 
bound to be repeated unless municipal agencies bear 
responsibility . . . .” Id. at 80 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
Unfortunately, Connick almost completely 
insulates prosecuting agencies from civil liability. 
“While seemingly narrow in its holding, Connick is 
significant because it forecloses one of the few 
remaining avenues for holding prosecutors civilly 
liable for official misconduct.” Keenan et al., supra 
n.14, at 204. Combined with the absolute immunity 
conferred to prosecutors for actions taken in their 
role as prosecutors, “the Court has created a classic 
                                                                                                    
disciplined”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against 
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. 
REV. 693, 697-98 (1987) (discussing the absence of ethical 
remedies against prosecutors). 
20 
catch-22 in which nobody can be held responsible for 
rights violations.” Scott Lemieux, The Impunity of 
the Roberts Court, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Apr. 1, 
2011, http://prospect.org/article/impunity-roberts-
court. The curtailment of civil remedies heightens 
the importance of the traditional remedy of a new 
trial.  
III. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S 
RULING IN BROWN WILL HAVE SERIOUS 
CONSEQUENCES IN LOUISIANA IF IT 
STANDS 
A. State v. Brown Enables Prosecutors to 
Make Untestable Decisions About What 
Constitutes “Favorable” Evidence 
Most Brady disputes pivot on the question of 
whether the exculpatory evidence is material. Pre-
trial, Brady leaves it to the prosecutors to decide 
materiality questions. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38. 
As the oral argument in Smith revealed to this 
Court, some prosecutors make highly questionable 
judgment calls about materiality.22 In cases where 
suppressed evidence the prosecutors decided pre-
trial was not material is actually turned over after 
trial, Brady provides a framework for courts to 
determine whether the conviction or sentence should 
be reversed. While prosecutors somewhat 
understandably continue to struggle with their pre-
                                                 
22 See Bidish Sarma, Do Supreme Court Justices 
Understand How Prosecutors Decide Whether to Disclose 
Exculpatory Evidence?, ACSBLOG, Mar. 17, 2016, 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/do-supreme-court-justices-
understand-how-prosecutors-decide-whether-to-disclose-
exculpatory. 
21 
trial materiality assessments,23 see Yaroshefsky, 
supra n.16, at 933 n.138,24 rarely have cases been 
decided on the doctrinally prior question of whether 
the evidence was “favorable” to the defendant. 
  The Louisiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Brown opens up the possibility that prosecutors will 
now utilize their discretion to decide certain types of 
evidence that once obviously met the favorability 
threshold no longer do. Equipping prosecutors—who 
by training learn to see evidence in a light favorable 
to the prosecution—with this tool for nondisclosure 
above and beyond the already-difficult materiality 
assessment raises serious concerns about Brady’s 
continued viability. Making ex ante determinations 
from a place of inherent cognitive bias, prosecutors 
have no reason to fear civil liability or professional 
discipline and likely have little concern about state 
court review; Brown will embolden them further.  
                                                 
23 “By requiring prosecutors to disclose more than 
material exculpatory evidence, the ABA Model Rules seek to 
avoid pitfalls that might arise if a prosecutor attempts to 
determine materiality before making a disclosure. . . . 
[A]ssessing materiality pre-trial requires prosecutors to 
‘anticipate what other evidence against the defendant will be 
by the end of the trial, and then speculate in hypothetical 
hindsight whether the evidence as issue would place ‘the whole 
case’ in a different light.’” ABA Amicus, supra, at *10. 
24 “Remarkably, current and some former prosecutors 
still defend the Orleans Parish DA’s argument in Smith v. Cain 
. . . .” 
22 
B. State v. Brown Increases the Risk of 
Wrongful Conviction and Will Engender 
Even More Undiscoverable Brady 
Violations 
Federal court rulings previously cited 
demonstrate that Louisiana courts have often read 
Brady so narrowly that evidence that fundamentally 
challenges the State’s trial narrative has been 
deemed immaterial. See, e.g., Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627; 
DiLosa, 279 F.3d 259. In light of Brown, state courts 
may not only look skeptically upon defendants’ 
claims that exculpatory evidence is material, but 
they will also provide the prosecution with the 
additional benefit of questioning defendants’ 
contentions that evidence is favorable. Adding an 
obstacle to the meaningful enforcement of Brady 
increases the risk of wrongful conviction. See, e.g., 
Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and 
Supreme Court Justices About Brady v. Maryland, 
13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 517, 541 (2012) (“nondisclosure 
of exculpatory evidence may result in the conviction 
of an innocent person”); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner Juan 
Smith, 2011 WL 3678809, at *31-32 n.10-11 
(documenting Brady violations that contributed to 
wrongful convictions in Orleans Parish). 
A significant percentage of the cases in which 
Brady violations have come to light are ones in 
which defendants were convicted of homicide crimes. 
This reality presumably reflects the fact that 
Louisiana provides post-conviction counsel to 
individuals under a death sentence. See LA. RS 
§ 15:169. However, most inmates serving sentences 
for non-capital crimes will never obtain post-
conviction legal representation or gain access to 
suppressed evidence. The vast majority of inmates 
23 
are indigent, and they have no right to counsel after 
direct appeal. Even those inmates intrepid enough to 
navigate post-conviction’s complexities without a 
lawyer confront insuperable investigative 
challenges; they are not even permitted to make 
requests under Louisiana’s public records law. All of 
these factors compound the tautology that many 
Brady violations never come to light because they 
involve hidden evidence.25 
Giving the State the opportunity to decide 
that possibly exculpatory evidence may not be 
favorable to the defendant will increase pre-trial 
suppression. Brown will thus engender even more 
undiscoverable Brady noncompliance. Because “[i]t 
is far too easy for Brady violations to pass unnoticed 
. . . . awarding new trials when violations are 
discovered is essential to promote justice in those 
cases and all others, by holding prosecutors to 
account when infractions surface.” Brief of Amicus 
Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers in Support of Petitioner Juan Smith, 2011 
WL 3739472, at *21 (emphasis in original).   
CONCLUSION 
 This case presents a critical opportunity for 
this Court to prevent the erosion of Brady in a 
jurisdiction with both a high volume of criminal 
prosecutions and a history of state court difficulty 
with the doctrine. Considering that the ethical 
complaint lodged against the very same prosecutors 
who obtained Mr. Brown’s death sentence was 
                                                 
25 See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not 
Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation 
to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 303, 306 (2010) (concluding that “it is fair to 
assume that most Brady violations go undiscovered”). 
24 
dismissed because of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Brown, professional discipline is off of the 
table. This Court should grant certiorari because the 
state courts need guidance, other mechanisms for 
holding prosecutors accountable have not functioned, 
and, left alone, the Brown ruling has the potential to 
usher in a new, darker age of disregard for Brady. 
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February 29, 2016 
 
Lawrence T. Dupre 
19929 Old Scenic Highway 
Zachary, Louisiana 70791 
 
 Re: Respondent: Thomas Stanford Block 
   (ODC File No. 0029050) 
   Hugo A. Holland, Jr. 
   (ODC File No. 0029051) 
  Complainant: Clayton M. Perkins, Thomas J. 
Thompson & Lawrence T. 
Dupre 
 
Dear Mr. Dupre: 
 
The purpose of this correspondence is to 
address the complaint that you filed with this office 
pursuant to your obligation under Rule 8.3(a) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct against Hugo Holland 
and Thomas Block regarding their ethical 
obligations under Rule 3.8(d). Specifically, your 
complaint brought to the attention of the ODC the 
facts regarding the failure to disclose a recorded 
inmate statement, recounting what he had been told 
2 
by Angola 5 inmate Barry Edge, regarding the tragic 
slaying of prison guard Captain David Knapp. 
From our investigation we determined that 
there was no factual dispute that the recorded 
statement, taken by Block and Holland, was not 
turned over to the defense in the matter of State of 
Louisiana vs. David Brown. Rather, in our judgment 
the only dispute was whether or not the contents of 
the statement was favorable to the accused to be 
used to mitigate the offense or sentence; and 
whether or not the provisions of Rule 3.8(d) 
incorporate the “materiality to outcome” component 
of the U.S. Supreme Court line of cases including 
Brady and its progeny. 
As you may be aware, there is a sharp debate 
across the country as to whether the “materiality to 
outcome” component comprises a part of the analysis 
to be undertaken by prosecutors pretrial who seek to 
comply with the provisions of Rule 3.8(d). It is our 
position that 3.8(d) does not incorporate the 
“materiality to outcome” considerations for many 
reasons, and that inferentially our court has already 
spoken to that issue in its disciplinary decision in In 
Re: Jordan. Our initial belief was bolstered by the 
trial judge’s grant of a new trial as to sentence in the 
Brown case where he determined that the withheld 
recorded statement was favorable to the accused and 
material as to outcome. 
The Court of Appeal reversed that 
determination on the issue of materiality, but may 
have used an erroneous standard when analyzing 
the issue. The Supreme Court on Friday February 
19th denied writs in a 4-3 decision. In doing so, a 
majority of the Court found that the recorded 
statement was neither ‘favorable’ nor ‘material’. I 
3 
note that while the Chief Justice dissented with 
reasons, two of the other justices dissented without 
reasons, but would have granted the writ and 
docketed the matter. 
As indicated above, there is a significant 
debate across the country regarding the scope of 
Rule 3.8(d) and it has divided states on the issue. At 
its essence, the cornerstone is whether or not 3.8(d) 
is ‘co-extensive’ with Brady such that a showing of 
“materiality to outcome” must be shown, or whether 
the “materiality to outcome” is not a component of 
the ethical consideration. Inasmuch as I view the 
“materiality to outcome” component as a backward 
looking consideration, I do not hold the belief that 
“materiality” should be or is a factor in analyzing 
prosecutor conduct under 3.8(d). However, there 
does not appear to be any jurisprudence or scholarly 
analysis suggesting that there is a variance between 
what is considered to be ‘favorable’ or ‘mitigating’ 
under the Brady case-law versus Rule 3.8(d). 
Because the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
found, specifically, that the recorded statement at 
issue was not ‘favorable’ in the Brown matter, that 
legal determination pretermits the issue of whether 
it was “material to outcome”. Simply put, the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose the recorded statement 
turns on whether it tends to negate guilt, mitigates 
the offense, or is otherwise mitigating information as 
to sentencing. If the determination is that it is not 
‘favorable’ in these ways, the failure of the 
prosecutor to disclose is not a violation of Rule 3.8(d) 
and the “materiality to outcome” analysis is not 
reached. 
Because the same Court that would consider 
the potential ethics violation has already determined 
4 
that the statement was not ‘favorable’, the filing of a 
disciplinary charge in this matter cannot be 
sustained at this time. I recognize that the 
defendant may challenge this ruling and that there 
exists the potential for a different outcome on this 
threshold issue. For that reason, I have determined 
that it is appropriate to close this investigation and 
dismiss this complaint at this time, reserving the 
right for this office to reopen this matter should a 
different ruling relevant to the analysis be handed 
down. A disciplinary prosecution at this juncture is 
unlikely to be successful and would be in effect ‘res 
judicata’ on the disciplinary violation precluding a 
‘retrial’ of the issue should the outcome change on 
appellate or writ review by a different court. 
Pursuant to Rule XIX, section 11(b)(3), you 
nonetheless have the right to request that this 
dismissal decision be reviewed by an independent 
hearing committee. To exercise that right you must 
notify this office in writing within 30 days of this 
dismissal decision. 
I thank you for bringing this issue to the 
attention of the ODC, and for your concerns for the 
ethical standards of our legal profession. 
 
Sincerely, 
/s/ Charles B. Plattsmier 
Charles B. Plattsmier 
Chief Disciplinary Counsel 
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